Political Dimesion WORK

The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster

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The Space Shuttle Disaster

Introduction

There are various political aspects surrounding the human and the environmental decision making factors which were associated with the January 28, 1986 launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger. The Shuttle exploded just a few minutes after the launch killing all the crew-members and destroying completely the vehicle. The cause that led to the Challenger tragedy were explored into detail. A great focus is put upon NASA’s use of a group decision support system (GDSS) meeting to formulate and make decisions surrounding the launch of the Challenger.

The disaster was succumb to a various contributing factors which include multiple priorities and demands which influenced NASA from operating in a more responsible and ethical manner. There was proof that NASA could have flawed its dataset in its GDSS and its mismanagement of the GDSS meeting (Koontz & Weihrich, 2012). Lastly, the inability of every GDSS member to vote anonymously on the decision on the aspect of launching the Challenger further became a critical factor, that which if could have been allowed would have prevented the space shuttle Challenger disaster.

Modes of political influence in the U.S. space shuttle

The U.S. space shuttle succumbed to political influence from various aspects. All the engineering efforts took place within a political context which finally imposed a major impact on the operational and technical decision-making. The U.S. politics played a huge part in contributing to the adoption of a vulnerable design during the very first approval of the entire process. Unrealistic promises were made with respect the program’s performance with an aim of keeping the manned space flight process alive after Apollo and the demise of the cold war (McDonald& Hansen, 2013). Moreover, the political pressure exerted on the engineering reality at that time led to emergence of a culture of denial coupled with overoptimistic risk assessment which consequently didn’t give a realistic position of the entire Challenger program.

Impact of inter-organizational politics between NASA and Thiokol

The testimonies made in the Rogers Commission showed that there is no mere mentioning of NASA safety staff. Neither the Marshall nor the Thiokol thought of inviting a safety representative to the hearings or rather to their teleconference. Lack of safety representative was on the mission of the management team which was tasked with making key decisions at the time of countdown to the Challenger flight.

The aspect of miscommunication between NASA and Thiokol hugely emerged in the Commission’s findings as technical uncertainties and failures to use information from past near misses. There was no reporting of relevant concerns to the management of the Challenger program. For instance, the top levels of NASA management who were considered responsible for the launch of the Challenger never heard of any concerns raised by the Morton Thiokol engineers or they didn’t even know about the degree of concerns raised by the erosion of the “O” rings in prior flights (Allinson, 2015).

How mangers could have prevented the space shuttle Challenger disaster

The investigations into the space shuttle Challenger disaster showed that the managers at Marshall and Thiokol could have known in prior that the case joints were hazardous. The best these mangers could do was to inform the senior officials in the Shuttle program or they could rather act promptly to ensure that there was reduction of the possible risks in order to prevent a predictable accident. That is, an effective system of communications within the management at the Center was a critical aspect in the success of the space shuttle Challenger.

The presidential commission led by Rogers was deduced why the scenario happened by giving explanation that there was communications problems which could have emerged from the interdependence of Marshall and Thiokol, that is, the lapses in statistical analysis by propulsion engineers, the groupthink of preflight reviews and the last minute teleconference, and the authorization management patterns at Marshall (Vaughan, American Council of Learned Societies & History E-Book Project, 2014). Thus, an effective inclusive communication among the space shuttle Challenger program management team could have saved the disaster.

Conclusion

There a number conclusions drawn on the primary cause and contributing issues associated with the space shuttle Challenger disaster. The group decision support system (GDSS) and the decision to launch the ability of every member to have unanimously voted was considered as a key factor which would have maintained the integrity of GDSS and the quality of decision-making.

The entire scenario of the Challenger incident have shown that just after the presentation of Thiokol to NASA, most of the group members of GDSS put concerns on the “O” ring situation and they believed that the issues raised by the Thiokol engineers were convincing cause for consideration to cancel the launch. However, a few selected senior officials were tasked with voting which was done verbally at the request of NASA. Therefore, it is strongly believed that a universal anonymous vote been conducted of the total GDSS membership, the members could have made the decision to cancel the launch.

References

Allinson, R. E. (2015). Saving human lives: Lessons in management ethics. Dordrecht: Springer.Koontz, H., & Weihrich, H. (2012). Essentials of management. New Delhi: McGraw-Hill.

McDonald, A. J., & Hansen, J. R. (2013). Truth, lies, and O-rings: Inside the space shuttleChallenger disaster. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Vaughan, D., American Council of Learned Societies., & History E-Book Project. (2014).TheChallenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA. Chicago:University of Chicago Press.